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Immigration adjudication is in an awkward position in the United States.1  
Although there is an intricate system to adjudicate immigration removal 
(deportation) cases, the system is hindered by restrictions on judicial review and 
the threat of further limitations.  The restrictions and the threats of further 
limitations reflect distaste for providing access to the courts to foreign nationals 
facing removal.2  There is a push and pull phenomenon, with the immigration 
adjudication system stretched uncomfortably between two forces.  On one side, 
there is a push to apply common notions of due process to immigration removal 
 + Professor of Law and Director, Law and Government Institute, Widener University School of 
Law.  Thank you to the Queen Mary School of Law, University of London, for hosting me as a 
Visiting Scholar.  This Article greatly benefitted from the insights of participants in a faculty 
colloquium at Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, the participants at the biennial 
Immigration Law Professors’ Conference at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, 
and the input of participants in the Migration and Law Network Conference at Birkbeck College 
School of Law, University of London.  Elspeth Guild, Steve Legomsky, Hiroshi Motomura, and 
Helena Wray provided invaluable comments on earlier versions of this Article.  Brent Johnson 
provided first-rate library assistance and Marissa Mowery provided excellent research assistance. 
 1. This Article focuses on removal adjudication and does not address applications for 
immigration benefits. 
 2. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration 
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615–16  (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky, Fear and 
Loathing] (“Immigration policy and judicial review have always had a kind of oil-and-water 
relationship.”). 
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cases, driven by the notion that the same concepts of procedural justice and 
access to justice should apply in immigration cases as would in any other 
context.  On the other side, there is a pull away from these common conceptions 
and a belief that less process and access to justice is not only acceptable, but 
preferable, when it comes to foreign nationals facing removal from the United 
States. 
One oft-stated justification for cutting back access to justice in the 
immigration removal context is that providing access to courts allows foreign 
nationals means to delay their removal.3  Some argue that by pursuing legal 
challenges in court, foreign nationals gain more time in the United States and 
delay, or perhaps ultimately prevent, removal from the United States.4  The delay 
rationale places the blame on individual foreign nationals and their attorneys for 
accessing justice.  The rationale assumes and promotes the idea that foreign 
nationals seek judicial review for less than honorable reasons, and therefore, 
curtailing access to the courts is justified.5 
This Article concludes that the delay rationale is “window dressing” for a 
deeper disagreement about the role of national sovereignty in immigration law.6  
The delay rationale rests upon, and is an expression of hope for the continued 
existence of, a conception of immigration sovereignty that places the will of the 
national government above all else.  It relies on a classical conception of 
immigration sovereignty rooted in the plenary power doctrine.7  As announced 
by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, the plenary power doctrine 
gives Congress and the President unfettered power over certain aspects of 
immigration law. 8   This plenary power notion of immigration sovereignty 
contrasts with a more modern notion of sovereignty, which expressly 
incorporates concern for the individual and envisions a more limited role for 
government when it comes to the treatment of individual foreign nationals.9  
 3. See infra Part I.B (explaining the delay rationale in detail). 
 4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23 (1961). 
 5. An empirical study questioned the major assumption underlying the delay rationale—that 
judicial review takes a long time.  Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf & Rebecca Gill, Buying Time? 
False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679, 681 (2014).  After analyzing 
over 1,600 immigration petitions from eleven federal circuit courts, the authors found the “results 
suggest that concerns about delay are overblown . . . .”  Id. at 682.  According to the study, the 
delay theory relies heavily on the assumption “that the federal court process takes a long time.”  Id. 
at 694.  Instead, the study concludes that “an appeal to a federal court may be the fastest part of the 
immigration adjudication system, and that federal courts often resolve weak cases quickly.”  Id. 
 6. Delay is a legitimate concern in structuring an adjudication system.  See, e.g., Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration 
Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1330–32 (1986) [Legomsky, Forum Choices].  This Article 
reveals, however, that something other than delay is motivating efforts to restrict court access in 
the context of judicial review of removal cases. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See infra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. 
 9. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–4 
(1984) [hereinafter Schuck, Transformation]. 
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While some aspects of the plenary power doctrine have softened and have 
become nuanced, this Article connects the delay rationale to the view of 
immigration sovereignty expressed in those foundational Supreme Court cases 
that established the plenary power doctrine. 
Other factors besides sovereignty, varying from individual to individual, 
motivate objections to providing access to courts to foreign nationals facing 
removal.  Those factors include general antipathy towards courts, political 
strategy, efficiency, costs, and, in some instances, xenophobia and racism.10  
This Article does not discount those forces.11  This Article instead focuses on 
the role of immigration sovereignty in motivating efforts to restrict access to 
courts under the banner of unjustified delay.  Viewing immigration adjudication 
through the lens of sovereignty reveals a need to peel back the argument about 
delay, and to acknowledge and resolve the debate over immigration sovereignty. 
By examining a similar phenomenon in the United Kingdom (U.K.), this 
Article demonstrates that the debate over the nature of immigration sovereignty 
must be resolved in the popular imagination as well as through formal legal 
means.  The U.K.’s elaborate system for review of immigration removal cases 
is subject to a multitude of restrictions and faces a nearly constant threat of 
further restrictions.12  Proponents of restrictions in the U.K. often cite concerns 
about delay as the primary justification for those restrictions.13  Thus, the U.K. 
is engaged in a similar debate, despite the fact that it has incorporated into its 
domestic law international obligations recognizing more modern notions of 
sovereignty, with a heavy emphasis on respect of individual rights.14  In the 
U.K., defining the role of sovereignty in the context of immigration remains a 
fierce battle.15  The U.K. experience does not provide a solution for the U.S. 
debate, but it does serve as a lesson that change in public perception is a 
necessary companion to formal legal change. 
Until the debate over immigration sovereignty is resolved, immigration 
adjudication in the United States will continue its uncomfortable existence.  This 
Article shifts the focus away from the distracting delay debate and instead 
focuses on fundamentally different perspectives of immigration sovereignty.16  
 10. See Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 2, at 1627–30.  Additionally, Professor 
Hiroshi Motomura has described a misconception that substantive immigration law is simple, and 
that the misconception contributes to an idea that maintaining the “rule of law” in the immigration 
law realm is uncomplicated and therefore court review is superfluous.  HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 189-92 (2014) [hereinafter MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION 
OUTSIDE]. 
 11. In fact, these forces could influence one’s preferred approach to immigration sovereignty. 
 12. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 205–206. 
 14. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 15. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 16. The awkwardness of immigration adjudication in the United States is connected to a 
broader, ongoing struggle to balance individual rights with government control in all aspects of 
immigration law.  See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that 
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Then, this Article contends that even if the United States achieves formal legal 
change, the U.K.’s experience demonstrates that a change in public perception 
of what sovereignty means in the context of immigration is required. 
I.  THE DELAY RATIONALE AND EFFORTS TO RESTRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL CASES 
A.  The Role of Judicial Review in Immigration Removal Cases 
Most adjudication of removal (deportation) cases in the United States occurs 
within an executive branch agency, but there is the possibility of independent 
judicial review in the federal courts.17  Federal court review of removal decisions 
is subject to timing, form, and substantive restrictions.18 
In most immigration removal cases, the process begins with the filing of a 
charging document called a Notice to Appear (NTA), which directs the foreign 
national to appear in Immigration Court. 19   The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) issues the charging document, listing the reasons why the 
government believes the foreign national is removable.20  Additionally, DHS 
will assign one of its lawyers to represent the government in the immigration 
proceeding.21  As the first step in the proceeding, an Immigration Court acts as 
the trial-level for removal adjudication.22  An immigration judge holds a hearing 
and ultimately decides whether to order the foreign national’s removal. 23   
Immigration judges are not members of the judicial branch; instead, immigration 
judges are attorneys employed by the Department of Justice (DOJ).24  Scholars, 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994) (comparing the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of alienage as a “legal status [that] . . . is a presumptively illegitimate basis for 
discriminatory treatment” with the idea that national sovereignty authorizes a nation to secure its 
borders from  “outsiders”). 
 17. See Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate 
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 502 (2008) [hereinafter Family, Stripping Judicial Review] 
(discussing the U.S. immigration adjudication process). 
 18. See id. at 502–03. 
 19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2014). 
 20. Id. at § 1003.15. 
 21. See Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), ICE, http://www.ice.gov/ 
about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (describing the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor as DHS’ largest legal program and the 
“exclusive legal representative for the U.S. government” in removal proceedings before the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
 22. Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 600 (2008) [hereinafter Family, A Broader View]. 
 23. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). 
 24. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673-(Sept. 20, 2007) (explaining that 
immigration judges are “Department of Justice attorneys who are designated by the-Attorney 
General to conduct such proceedings, and they are-subject to the Attorney General’s direction and 
control.”). 
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including the author, have debated whether these judges have sufficient 
decisional independence from their employer, the DOJ.25  A DOJ employee 
presides over the hearing, while an employee of DHS, another executive branch 
agency, represents the government during that hearing.  Nearly half of the 
individuals in Immigration Court, however, appear unrepresented. 26   The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) does not provide for 
government-funded counsel in Immigration Court.27 
After the immigration judge issues her order, both the foreign national and the 
government have an opportunity to appeal the decision to the second level of 
agency adjudication, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).28  As part of 
DOJ, the BIA hears appeals from immigration judge decisions.29  Members of 
the BIA are also not a part of the judicial branch, nor do they receive the statutory 
protections afforded to administrative law judges.30  Instead, the BIA members 
are attorneys employed by DOJ. 31  Appeals to the BIA are almost always 
decided solely on paper submissions. 32   The BIA reviews an immigration 
judge’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.33  The Board has de 
novo review authority over questions of law, challenges to the application of law 
to facts, and questions of discretion in appeals from immigration judge 
decisions.34 
 25. See, e.g., Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 600. 
 26. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FY 
2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig. 9 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (finding that in Fiscal Year 2012, fifty-six percent of respondents 
appearing in immigration court were represented, which was in increase over Fiscal Year 2009, in 
which only forty-five percent were represented). 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).  In April 2013, DOJ and DHS announced a policy to provide 
greater procedural protections for unrepresented respondents with serious mental disorders who 
appear in immigration court.  Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Dep’t of Justice 
& the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees 
with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/press/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html.  Further, in April 2013, a 
federal district court judge held that immigration detainees with mental disorders have a right to 
government-funded counsel.  See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG, 2013 WL 
3674492, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 28. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(c), 1003.3(a)(1). 
 29. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c). 
 30. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1); see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012) (providing administrative 
law judges procedural protections in adverse employment actions through the Merit Systems 
Protection Board). 
 31. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). 
 32. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.2(a) (2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/BIAPracticeManual.pdf#page=103 (“Oral argument 
is held at the discretion of the Board and is rarely granted.”). 
 33. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). 
 34. Id. at § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).  See also In re A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 496 (BIA 2008) 
(explaining that the BIA retains independent review authority over “pure questions of law and the 
application of a particular standard of law to [the] facts” of the case). 
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The BIA’s decision represents the final agency action.35  If the final agency 
action is an order to remove the foreign national, the foreign national may seek 
judicial review of the agency’s order.36  At this point, the process shifts from 
adjudication within the executive branch to a hearing in an independent, 
constitutionally authorized Article III court.37  It is not until this moment of 
judicial review that a non-agency employee would have authority over the 
decision to remove.  In seeking judicial review, the foreign national could 
challenge mistakes of fact, law, or abuses of discretion, and could raise 
constitutional challenges, including any alleged violations of the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
A foreign national seeking judicial review in an Article III court will discover, 
however, that Congress has curtailed the availability of judicial review in 
immigration removal cases.38  The statutory authorization for judicial review 
over removal cases begins by authorizing judicial review directly in a federal 
court of appeals, but also chips away at that grant by listing “[m]atters not subject 
to judicial review[.]”39  Congress insulated many discretionary decisions from 
review, including whether to grant relief from removal.40  However, judicial 
review remains over discretionary decisions related to the denial of an 
application for asylum.41  Removal decisions based on convictions for a variety 
of crimes are also not subject to judicial review, unless the individual 
challenging removal raises constitutional claims or questions of law. 42   
Additionally, there are timing and form of action restrictions.43 
B.  Efforts to Limit Immigration Judicial Review and the Delay Justification 
From the advantage of hindsight, the United States has been on a trajectory of 
narrowing and channeling the availability of judicial review over removal cases 
 35. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7). 
 36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2012). 
 37. See id. at § 1252(a). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at § 1252(a)(2) (limiting matters subject to judicial review).  See also Family, 
A Broader View, supra note 22, at 608–09.  The availability of judicial review over removal cases 
implicates several thorny constitutional issues, such as the immigration plenary power doctrine 
(discussed in Part II), congressional control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts generally, and 
the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction.  See generally Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: 
Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 
(1997) [hereinafter Benson, Back to the Future]. 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). 
 40. See id. at § 1252(a)(2)(B). 
 41. Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(C).  See also Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010) (holding that 
§ 1252(a)(2) does not bar judicial review of determinations made discretionary by regulation). 
 42. Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D). 
 43. See, e.g., id. at § 1252(b)(1) (establishing that a petition for review must be filed within 
thirty days after the final administrative decision to remove); id. at § 1252(b)(9) (consolidating all 
questions of law and fact for review into the statutory review scheme and prohibiting habeas corpus 
petitions unless otherwise provided by statute); id. at § 1252(f)(1)(B) (limiting the use of class 
actions). 
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since at least 1961.44  In 1961, Congress eliminated the role of the federal district 
courts in reviewing removal orders.  Congress directed all those seeking judicial 
review to file a petition for review directly with a U.S. Court of Appeals.45  
Before 1961, immigration statutes did not specifically address judicial review of 
removal orders.46  Filing a habeas corpus petition in a federal district court was 
the main method of obtaining judicial review.47  A federal court of appeals could 
review a district court’s rejection of a habeas petition.48  However, in 1961, 
Congress added a statutorily mandated procedure for obtaining review that 
eliminated the role of the federal district courts, as well as instituted a six-month 
time limit on when challenges could be brought and a requirement to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 49   Congress enacted the 1961 legislation after the 
Supreme Court recognized review of immigration cases under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).50  The 1961 statute was intended to limit 
the possibilities for review opened up by the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
review under the APA.51 
Legislative reports explained that concerns about delay motivated the 1961 
narrowing of judicial review.52  One report stated: 
The Committee on the Judiciary has been disturbed in recent years to 
observe the growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by 
undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but which 
are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying 
indefinitely their deportation from this country. . . . The alien whose 
sole immigration offense is, perhaps, a defect in his visa, or an 
overextended stay as a visitor, usually accepts the order of deportation 
and departs. Other aliens, mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral, or 
narcotic peddlers, manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only 
 44. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 752 (5th ed. 2003); see also Hirsohi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court 
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 461–66 (2006) 
[hereinafter Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus]. 
 45. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651. 
 46. See Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 256 (1998). 
 47. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 38, at 1431. 
 48. Id. 
 49. § 5(a), 75 Stat. at 651; H.R. REP. NO. 87-565, at 1 (1961) (“The purpose of [section 5] is 
to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the 
deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States, by adding a new section 106 to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.”). 
 50. See Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at 462–63 (discussing Congress’ 
reaction to Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) and Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 
(1956)). 
 51. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 752. 
 52. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-565, at 6-7; H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23 (1961).  See also 
Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of Carlos Marcello, in 
IMMIGRATION STORIES 134, 136–37 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
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because their ill-gotten gains permit them to procure the services of 
astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit the judicial 
process. Without any reflection upon the courts, it is undoubtedly now 
the fact that such tactics can prevent enforcement of the deportation 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by repetitive 
appeals to the busy and overworked courts with frivolous claims of 
impropriety in the deportation proceedings.53 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower also expressed the delay rationale when he 
stated to Congress, “I have previously called the attention of the Congress to the 
necessity for a strengthening of our laws in respect to the aliens who resort to 
repeated judicial reviews and appeals for the sole purpose of delaying their 
justified expulsion from this country.”54 
Congress further enacted major restrictions on judicial review in 1996.55  
These restrictions maintained the 1961 statutory framework requiring filing of 
petitions for review in the courts of appeals, but severely narrowed the ability of 
the courts of appeals to review removal decisions. 56   Congress enacted 
restrictions affecting the timing and form of challenges, as well as restrictions 
on judicial review based on the substance of the case.57  As described above, the 
substantive restrictions include provisions that eliminate review over many 
executive discretionary decisions in removal cases and that limit review of 
removal orders based on the commission of various criminal acts.58 
Congress accepted the 1996 restrictions with little debate prior to enactment.59  
While legislative history is scarce, there is evidence that proponents of the 1996 
restrictions advanced the delay rationale.60  For example, the New York Times 
reported that “[l]awmakers who supported the bill said it was necessary to 
unclog an immigration system swamped with lawsuits by people without 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086, at 22–23. 
 54. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. In 1988, Congress shortened the time limit for filing a petition for review from six months 
to sixty days for those whose removal orders were based on an aggravated felony conviction.  
National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7347(b)(1), 102 Stat. 4181, 
4472 (1988).  In 1990, Congress shortened the time limit to thirty days.  Immigration Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 100-649, § 502(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048.  Before 1996, Congress enacted other 
restrictions aimed at individuals with aggravated felony convictions, but 1996 marked a major 
restructuring of immigration judicial review.  See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2026.  This section 
discusses changes implemented by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which superseded earlier changes brought by the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996.  See Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at 
463–64 (discussing the sequence of IIRIRA superseding AEDPA). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 59. David Johnston, Government is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A20. 
 60. See id. 
                                                        
2014] Removing the Distraction of Delay 107 
citizenship or residency rights who used the Federal courts to prolong their stays 
in the United States or even gain a foothold on American citizenship.” 61    
Following the bill’s passage, Dan Stein (executive director of the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform), expressed support for the restrictions, 
specifically a limit on class actions, asserting that allowing class actions would 
have allowed “illegal aliens, aliens without right to be here[,] the right to stay 
here for years on end . . . .” 62    Additionally, then-Senate Immigration 
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer Abraham explained that the restrictions were 
aimed to address abuses of the system committed by “criminal immigrants.”63  
He wrote, “Criminal immigrants demonstrated time and again an ability to delay 
deportations through administrative appeals, judicial review and habeas corpus 
petitions.”64  He expressed a need “to crack down on those who come to the 
United States and abuse our legal system . . . .”65 
Through the Real ID Act of 2005, Congress again narrowed judicial review.66  
The House Conference Report accompanying the Act highlighted delay as a 
motivating factor. 67   With the REAL ID Act, Congress counteracted the 
Supreme Court decision INS v. St. Cyr,68 in which the Court held that Congress 
had not spoken clearly enough to eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction.69  In the 
REAL ID Act, Congress expressly stated its intent to repeal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction and to establish the petition for review procedure as the sole 
mechanism for reviewing a removal order.70 
The delay rationale appears in the legislative history.  The conference report 
accompanying the Act stated, “Among the many problems caused by St. Cyr, 
the most significant is that this decision allows criminal aliens to delay their 
expulsion from the United States for years.”71  Additionally, the report asserted 
that “criminal aliens will have fewer opportunities to delay their removal” after 
the enactment of the legislation.72 
 61. Id. 
 62. Interview by Richard Gonzalez with Dan Stein, Exec. Dir., Fed of Am. Immigration 
Reform, in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 26, 1996). 
 63. Spencer Abraham, Letter to the Editor, Law Addressed Abuses of Criminal Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A14. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)) (eliminating other forms of jurisdiction for review of removal orders). 
 67. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 171 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
 68. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 69. C.f. Motomura, Lens of Habeas Corpus, supra note 44, at 486–87 (explaining that the 
enactment of the REAL ID Act was Congress’ direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
St. Cyr). 
 70. Id. at 487. 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173. 
 72. Id. at 174. 
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Within the last ten years, Congress has debated major immigration reform 
bills, but none have passed both houses.73  Examining proposed immigration 
reform bills reveals further instances of proponents asserting the delay 
justification to support a decrease in the availability of judicial review.74  First, 
there was a failed attempt to further limit judicial review of removal cases during 
a 2005– 2006  effort to overhaul U.S. immigration law.75  Second, in 2013, there 
was another futile attempt to restrict review over legalization decisions as a part 
of immigration reform efforts.76 
With respect to the first example, during 2005– 2006, proponents of narrowed 
judicial review proposed adding a certificate of reviewability requirement.77  
The requirement would have added a substantial hurdle to filing a petition for 
review of a removal order.78  Under this proposal, a filed petition for review 
would be stalled until a court of appeals judge issued a certificate of 
reviewability. 79   The judge could issue a certificate if the foreign national 
seeking review made a “substantial showing that the petition for review is likely 
to be granted.”80  A judge’s decision to refuse to issue a certificate would be 
unreviewable by the rest of the members of the court of appeals.81  If a judge 
failed to act on the request for a certificate, the legislation envisioned that the 
petition for review would be denied.82  The proposal to add the certificate of 
reviewability requirement took place against a backdrop of a dramatic increase 
in the number of removal petitions for review filed in U.S. Courts of Appeals.83 
The certificate of reviewability requirement appeared as part of a U.S. House 
of Representatives bill called “Immigration Litigation Abuse Reduction.”84  The 
legislative history reveals that concerns about delay and frivolous filings 
motivated proponents to push for the certificate of reviewability requirement.85  
The House Republican majority’s report on the bill concluded that the “vast 
majority” of petitions for review filed were ultimately denied.86  Therefore, the 
 73. Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 506–07. 
 74. See id. at 513, 521. 
 75. See id. at 500 (discussing introduction of the certificate of reviewability as an attempt to 
limit frivolous suits). 
 76. Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9-10 (2013) 
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 77. See Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 506–28. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 509. 
 80. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 805(b)(D)(iii) (2005).  See also Family, Stripping Judicial 
Review, supra note 17, at 509. 
 81. Family, Stripping Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 509. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 506. 
 84. H.R. 4437, at § 805(b). 
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 109-345, at 77–78 (2005). 
 86. Id. at 77. 
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report concludes that the increase in the number of filed petitions for review 
must be due to an increase in the filing of meritless appeals.87 
When the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered the certificate 
of reviewability gatekeeping requirement, two supporters of the measure 
mentioned frivolous filings and delay objections as justifications for the 
procedure.  One federal court of appeals judge testified: “Even if the appeal lacks 
all merit, the backlog of cases in the circuit courts provides an incentive to appeal 
by almost guaranteeing a significant delay in deportation.”88  Similarly, a DOJ 
representative argued that the certificate of reviewability would remove the 
incentive to file a petition for review as a means to delay removal.89 
With respect to the second example, the delay justification surfaced as part of 
the 2013 debate over immigration reform.  While not directly addressing judicial 
review of removal cases, proponents of providing limited judicial review over 
agency decisions to legalize the immigration status of foreign nationals raised 
the delay rationale as a justification for providing less process.90  During the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s discussions, Senator Charles Grassley 
proposed an amendment that would have severely limited access to the federal 
courts to review an agency legalization decision.91  The Committee rejected the 
amendment.92  In explaining his desire to cabin judicial review, Senator Grassley 
stated, “you can have people forever delaying deportation because of the ability 
to appeal[,]” and he expressed a concern that an “immigrant who has filed a . . . 
meritless application under the [legalization] program[,] could hold up his 
removal for many years . . . .”93 
II.  DELAY AND A DISPUTE OVER IMMIGRATION SOVEREIGNTY 
As previously described, proponents of narrowed judicial review consistently 
float one justification that blames foreign nationals and their attorneys for the 
need for decreased access.  This argument for decreased access characterizes 
foreign nationals as acting under improper motivations.  According to this 
narrative, foreign nationals file frivolous lawsuits to delay removal.  Therefore, 
the need to narrow court access is the fault of foreign nationals who allegedly 
seek to abuse the system. 
 87. See id. at 77–78. 
 88. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing on S. 2611 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 50 (2006) (statement of J. Carlos T. Bea, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit). 
 89. See id. at 27 (statement of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice). 
 90. See Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9–11 (2013) 
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 14–15 (demonstrating that twelve out of eighteen committee members rejected 
Senator Grassley’s amendment to limit access to federal courts). 
 93. Id. at 9, 10 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
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However, the argument about delay is not simply about delay.  Digging 
deeper, this Article exposes that the chances for delay are scarce and that 
proponents of the delay rationale actually are expressing a preference for the 
strongest form of plenary power.  The delay rationale is an unsupported and 
convenient diversion from the underlying conflict about how to balance 
individual rights with government control in immigration law.  Further debate 
in the context of that underlying conflict, rather than placing the blame on 
foreign nationals seeking access to courts, is needed. 
A.  Delay or Something Else? 
Six observations lend support to the conclusion that the delay rationale is not 
solely about delay.  First, anecdotal evidence usually is the only support for the 
assertion that there is prevalent abuse of court access.  The empirical and 
administrative design questions of whether, and to what extent, foreign nationals 
seek judicial review as a tactic to delay deportation and what constitutes an 
acceptable amount of delay in any adjudication are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  The failure of supporters of decreased judicial review to justify 
empirically the claim of delay, however, signals a need to examine the 
justification more deeply.  In fact, one study has determined claims of delay 
through federal court action are overstated, and federal courts usually resolve 
these cases in a matter of months.94  The study further notes that most non-
citizens do not pursue judicial review at all.95  Instead of delay during the federal 
court stage, the study points to greater delay at the administrative level, 
particularly with respect to waits for a hearing before an immigration judge.96  
These delays are the result of increased enforcement efforts and a lack of 
concomitant resources devoted to immigration courts.97  Failure to account for 
this information leads to overemphasis on anecdotal evidence. 
Second, mandatory detention provisions dictate the detention of many foreign 
nationals during their removal proceedings, including during judicial review.98  
To a detained foreign national, seeking judicial review would mean additional 
time in custody, not additional time to live freely in the United States. 
Third, as Professor Stephen H. Legomsky has recognized, Congress has 
already prevented judicial review from delaying removal by not providing an 
 94. See Kagan, Marouf & Gill, supra note 5, at 696–97. 
 95. Id. at 689–90. 
 96. Id. at 721–22 (noting immigration judicial review in the federal courts of appeals usually 
takes less than a year, while the average duration of a case in the administrative immigration court 
is 550 days). 
 97. Ellen Frankman, Immigration Judge: Courts Overwhelmed & Under-Resourced, TAKE 
AWAY (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/immigration-judge-says-courts-need-
reform/.  See also Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of 
November 2014, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_ 
backlog_avgdays.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 98. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012). 
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automatic stay of removal pending judicial review.99  The reviewing federal 
court must now affirmatively grant a stay, which means the foreign national 
could be removed from the United States while a petition for judicial review is 
pending if no stay is granted.100  Consequently, judicial review alone does not 
guarantee a delay in removal. 
Fourth, Professor Lenni B. Benson has explained how previous restrictions on 
judicial review in the United States have led to protracted litigation over the 
meaning of those restrictions and their validity, including increased litigation 
over constitutional claims.101  From an efficiency perspective, simply allowing 
the courts to review a removal decision would be more efficient than risking the 
possibility of extra litigation over whether the court may hear the claim.  
Furthermore, this suggests that changing the judicial review process, rather than 
blocking access, may increase efficiency.102  Ultimately, the pursuit of cuts to 
judicial review, which result in additional litigation, suggests efforts to narrow 
court access are not based solely on efficiency concerns. 
Fifth, other existing mechanisms divert foreign nationals from entering the 
civil immigration adjudication system and promote quick removal with little 
process. 103   Implementation of such “nonjudicial removals” has increased 
exponentially, comprising seventy-five percent of all removals in 2012.104  For 
example, the expedited removal program diverts certain foreign nationals from 
a hearing before an immigration judge and instead grants border patrol officers 
the authority to remove the foreign national.105  Congress did not provide for 
robust judicial review of individual expedited removal orders. 106   Another 
example is Operation Streamline, which allows for removal through criminal 
prosecution of foreign nationals for certain immigration violations.107  Foreign 
nationals are sentenced en masse, with judges spending as little as twenty-five 
 99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1649–50 (2010) [hereinafter Legomsky, Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication]. 
 100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B); Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra 
note 99, at 1649–50. 
 101. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 38, at 1483–85; Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper 
Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration 
Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006) [hereinafter Benson, Making 
Paper Dolls]. 
 102. See, e.g., Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 99, at 1720 
(recommending a re-design of judicial review). 
 103. See Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 611, 624 (categorizing the mechanisms by 
which to divert foreign nationals from immigration adjudication, such as government-imposed 
waivers of access and expedited removals). 
 104. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: 
RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 24 (2014), available at http://www.migration 
policy.org/research/deportation-dilemma-reconciling-tough-humane-enforcement. 
 105. Id. at 25–26. 
 106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (2012). 
 107. Family, A Broader View, supra note 22, at 627–28. 
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seconds per matter. 108   An individual diverted from the civil immigration 
adjudication system into one of these channels has no opportunity to delay 
removal by seeking access to court. 
Sixth, the argument about delay is raised regardless of whether review has 
already been narrowed.  Proponents of restricted access to courts have no clear 
concept of what level of judicial review is ideal.  The logical extension of 
constant, unfocused narrowing of judicial review is the continual elimination of 
access to courts, perhaps to the point of no access.  This suggests that those 
claiming delay contemplate a deeper question of whether the foreign national 
should have court access at all. 
Close examination of claims of delay and abuse of court access reveal a lack 
of depth in the argument.  Further claims of delay reflect something else. They 
reflect a desire to hang on to a classical plenary power notion of the 
government’s role in immigration law. 
B.  The Dispute over Immigration Sovereignty 
Immigration law invokes substantial questions about the nature and strength 
of government power.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court has linked immigration 
law to national sovereignty, the rights of individual foreign nationals often 
conflict with the strong force of sovereign will.  The proper balance between 
individual rights and national will is unresolved, with some preferring to adhere 
to a classical version of plenary power while others promote a more progressive 
approach that allows room for individual rights.  There is a link between 
immigration law and sovereignty, and the delay rationale is “window dressing” 
for a debate over the ideal balance between these competing interests. 
1.  What is Immigration Sovereignty? 
Immigration law implicates sovereignty.109  In the late nineteenth century 
Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,110 the U.S. Supreme 
Court linked immigration law with notions of national sovereignty.  The 
Supreme Court held that the federal government’s power to regulate 
immigration was founded in the fundamental sovereignty of the country.111  The 
Court stated: 
 108. See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on 
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at A12. 
 109. Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 489, 559 (“The link between immigration and national sovereignty has a long history in 
the United States.”). 
 110. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 111. See id. at 609.  See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 129–31 (2002).  For a more thorough discussion of other theories justifying the use 
of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and 
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The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty 
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those 
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its 
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the 
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained 
on behalf of any one.112 
Because the decision whether to admit a foreign national into the country was 
characterized as a decision that cuts at the heart of the identity, size, and shape 
of the nation, the Supreme Court described a plenary power available to the 
political branches in the realm of immigration law.113 
This decision established an unusual trajectory for immigration law in the 
United States.  While constitutional principles evolved in other contexts, the 
Supreme Court continued to hold that those advancements did not apply to 
immigration law.114  For example, Congress has almost unfettered discretion to 
set the conditions of admission into the United States115 and to establish reasons 
for deporting a foreign national. 116   Additionally, procedural due process 
protections do not extend to those applying for initial entry or to those with long 
absences from the United States.117  The status quo is rooted in the plenary power 
doctrine, which in turn is at least partially rooted in a notion of sovereignty 
dating back to the nineteenth century.  As described by Professor Kevin Johnson, 
the Principle of Plenary Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 261, 269–71, 275–77 (1984) [hereinafter 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power]. 
 112. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. 
 113. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 184–85 (1987) [hereinafter LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY] (“[The sovereignty theory] has served as a pedestal on which the plenary power 
doctrine has been based.”); Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 
273–74 (describing and criticizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on sovereignty as a justification 
for the plenary power doctrine). 
 114. Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and 
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925–26 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten More 
Years] (citations omitted) (“For more than a hundred years, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has been telling us that immigration law is just plain different.”). 
 115. In a 1977 decision, the Supreme Court discussed courts’ “limited judicial responsibility” 
in reviewing Congress’ choices with respect to admission categories.  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 
793 n.5 (1977).  The Court described congressional power as “largely immune from judicial 
control.”  Id. at 792.  While this language may signal a movement away from absolute power, the 
Fiallo Court held Congress to a very mild standard of scrutiny.  The Court looked only for a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the congressional action.  Id. at 794. 
 116. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952). 
 117. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1950); Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
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the plenary power doctrine is “[f]ounded on notions of the raw sovereignty of 
the nation-state . . . .”118 
Admittedly, immigration law has evolved in some contexts, with courts 
asserting a more involved role in reviewing certain types of immigration 
decision-making, particularly in the areas of removal procedures and post-
removal detention.  For example, individuals within U.S. borders are entitled to 
due process protections during removal proceedings. 119   Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has developed a doctrine under which certain returning lawful 
permanent residents do not lose due process protection upon physically exiting 
the boundaries of the United States.120 
In some respects, immigration law is lurching towards mainstream 
constitutional law, but in many respects, it is still stuck in its nineteenth century 
roots. 121  Scholars have discussed this transformation, documenting plenary 
power doctrine trends and predicting what the future may hold for that 
concept.122 
For example, Professor Peter Schuck has argued that immigration law is 
slowly progressing from its classical roots towards “communitarian” ideals.123  
Schuck described the development of classical immigration law in the late 
nineteenth century as a rejection of the liberal values that epitomized the first 
period of U.S. immigration. 124   During that first period, from the nation’s 
founding to the 1880s, the country’s outlook on immigration was driven by a 
focus on the individual.125  According to Schuck, “[t]he liberalism of America’s 
first century conceived of persons as autonomous, self-defining individuals 
 118. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 197–98 (2003) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Open Borders?] (“Under a strict plenary power regime, the U.S. government may act as 
if it is in a state of nature without legal constraints in a modern ‘survival of the fittest’ world.”). 
 119. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 
(2001). 
 120. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–98 (1953); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 
32–33 (1982). 
 121. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 743, 810 (2013) (discussing the history and continuing role of sovereignty as a 
justification for extra-constitutional authority over immigration law). 
 122. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 303–05 
(predicting the continuing expansion of judicial review); Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 
114, at 936–37 (predicting the weakening, but not complete abolition of judicial deference to 
Congress in immigration cases); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 610–11 
(1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms] (predicting the courts will avoid 
directly addressing constitutional issues and will continue to apply “phantom constitutional norms 
much more favorable to aliens”); Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 73–75 (expressing 
uncertainty of the future of immigration law but identifying three characteristics of the development 
of that body of law). 
 123. See Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4. 
 124. Id. at 2–3. 
 125. Id. at 2. 
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possessing equal moral worth and dignity and equally entitled to society’s 
consideration and respect.”126  The individual enjoyed “maximum liberty,” and 
this outlook “was reflected in a policy of essentially open borders[.]”127 
The outlook shifted in the late nineteenth century as “[l]iberal values were 
challenged by an array of exclusionary impulses[,]” including racial prejudice 
and xenophobia.128  As Schuck describes, this shift resulted in a sea of change 
in immigration policy, with the focus shifting from individual liberty to national 
sovereignty concerns.129  Under this new order, the nation holds all of the cards 
and the power to issue its consent to enter as it sees fit.130 
Classical immigration law envisions a small role for courts in reviewing the 
immigration actions of the political branches. 131   Schuck observed a link 
between “the powerful conception of national sovereignty” that is so tied to 
classical immigration law and the reticence of federal judges to interject the 
courts into review of immigration law. 132   Under a regime with federal 
immigration law rooted in a concept of sovereignty (with the nation always 
triumphing over the individual), there is little to no role for federal judges to 
advance the interests of the individual. 
This classical immigration law scheme, rooted in racial prejudice and bigotry, 
is still a major influence in immigration law.133  The new “communitarian” 
approach (as described by Schuck) 134  is driven by a principle that “the 
government owes legal duties to all individuals who manage to reach America’s 
shores[.]”135  Schuck observed that this new outlook was building momentum, 
but that it had not yet displaced classical immigration law.136 
Other scholars have also persuasively presented diminishing aspects of the 
plenary power doctrine.  For example, Professors Stephen H. Legomsky and 
Hiroshi Motomura have discussed that although certain court practices have 
weakened the plenary power doctrine, it still exists.137  Legomsky recognized 
techniques of avoidance, including the Supreme Court’s occasional practice of 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 3. 
 129. See id. at 3. 
 130. Id. at 47–48 (tying classical immigration law to the rights-privilege distinction once 
prevalent in mainstream constitutional law). 
 131. Id. at 14–15. 
 132. Id. at 17. 
 133. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); Cleveland, supra note 111, at 
14 (describing the origins of the plenary power doctrine as rooted “in a peculiarly unattractive, late-
nineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American society and federal power”). 
 134. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 135. Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 296–99, 302–03; 
Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 600. 
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turning a blind eye to the doctrine.138  Legomsky also recognized, and Motomura 
further discussed, courts’ use of statutory interpretation techniques to soften the 
blow of the plenary power doctrine.139  This phenomenon allows a court to avoid 
the harsh effects of the plenary power doctrine through the use of “phantom 
constitutional norms,” created through heavy reliance on statutory interpretation 
tools.140  These “phantom norms” exist in immigration law, as opposed to an 
actual, coherent constitutional structure. 141   The “articulated constitutional 
norm—unreviewable plenary power[,]” is effectively weakened if courts decide 
cases through statutory interpretation, in which constitutional concerns may be 
considered.142  Additionally, the willingness of courts to develop procedural due 
process concepts in immigration law has weakened the plenary power 
doctrine.143 
While the plenary power doctrine has not remained static, and its weaknesses 
are well-documented, the Supreme Court has never formally disowned the 
doctrine.  At best, there has been a shift from it, but scholars still debate how far 
courts have moved away from the doctrine.144 
The Supreme Court’s failure to confront the doctrine directly has allowed the 
classical notion of immigration sovereignty to remain the default; weaknesses in 
the doctrine are exceptions rather than the rule.  This allows the classical notion 
of immigration sovereignty to pervade immigration law discourse, including 
policy debates about judicial review.  Those promoting the delay rationale 
actually are arguing for the classical form of plenary power; they are arguing 
that the will of the sovereign trumps any individual interests. 
2.  Immigration Sovereignty and the Delay Rationale 
The classical notion of immigration sovereignty is in conflict with judicial 
review, which by its nature focuses on individual rights and tests the 
government’s use of power.  Under the classical notion of immigration 
sovereignty, a nation is unrestrained to set its immigration policy, free to set the 
conditions of entry, and free to revoke permission to be within the sovereign 
borders on whatever substantive criteria it deems necessary.  A more modern 
notion of sovereignty places greater restraint on the power of the nation towards 
individuals and integrates human rights considerations, such as the effects the 
 138. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 299. 
 139. Legomsky, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 156; Motomura, 
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 549. 
 140. Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 122, at 564–65. 
 141. Id. at 549. 
 142. Id. at 564. 
 143. See Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 111, at 298–99; Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1627–28 (1992). 
 144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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nation’s actions may have on the individual.145  As Professor Elizabeth Bruch 
has explained, the international law approach to sovereignty has evolved since 
the late nineteenth century, now incorporating concerns about human rights.146 
Immigration law is stuck between the classical and more modern 
approaches, 147  as evidenced by the debate over efforts to restrict foreign 
nationals’ access to the courts to challenge removal decisions.  Those who want 
to limit access to the courts are motivated, at least in part, by a desire to maintain 
the classical notion of immigration sovereignty epitomized by the plenary power 
doctrine.  The House Report supporting the 1961 restrictions on review stated: 
“it is undoubtedly now the fact that such [delay] tactics can prevent enforcement 
of the deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”148  This 
language reveals an underlying position that effectuating deportations is of 
paramount importance, while individual considerations are superfluous. 
Other efforts to restrict judicial review have also dismissed the value of 
individual rights, raising the need to get the particular individual out of the 
country to enforce the national will.149  Proponents of the 1996 restrictions 
referred to “illegal aliens [who do not have] the right to be here . . . .”150  This 
suggests “a nation versus individual” outlook that downplays individual 
concerns.  Similarly, supporters of the REAL ID Act of 2005 emphasized the 
bill’s ability to isolate “criminal aliens” and to prevent them from delaying 
removal by narrowing their access to courts.151 
Professor Frank Wu has explained that under a more modern conception of 
immigration sovereignty, the nation is defined not only by border lines and the 
ability to dictate who may cross those lines under what circumstances, but also 
 145. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Open or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights, 96 
KY. L.J. 197, 221 (2007–2008).    See also Banks, supra note 109, at 527–28; Kitty Calavita, U.S. 
Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 143, 147 (1994) (acknowledging a “contradiction between the concepts of inalienable human 
rights and national sovereignty”). 
 146. Bruch, supra note 145, at 221 (“While still far from displacing the dominance of 
sovereignty, the principles of self-determination, freedom of movement and nondiscrimination 
have started to constrain unfettered notions of sovereignty as a matter of international human rights 
law.”). 
 147. See Johnson, Open Borders?, supra note 118, at 207–08 (describing the difficulty of 
incorporating notions of individual rights into a an immigration system so focused on national 
sovereignty); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After 
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1398–1402 
(2006) (describing the competing perspectives of immigration monism, in which “the protection of 
national sovereignty [is] the primary goal of immigration law[,]” and immigration pluralism, which 
recognizes that immigration law must serve other goals as well). 
 148. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part I.B. 
 150. Interview by Richard Gonzalez with Dan Stein, supra note 62. 
 151. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 174 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
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by how the nation treats those under its power. 152   While not completely 
dismissing national sovereignty, Wu argued that “[n]ational sovereignty, by 
itself, does not establish that the nation can regulate its borders by standards that 
a consensus would hold absurd applied everywhere else.”153 
Similarly, judicial review, which by its nature focuses on an individual and 
considers how the nation treats an individual foreign national, must seem foreign 
to someone who adheres to the purest form of plenary power, in which national 
power is unfettered.  As Schuck described, when a more “communitarian” 
notion of immigration law takes hold and the role of individual concerns 
increases, there is a phenomenon where accessing courts necessarily delays 
removal and allows for consideration of individual circumstances.154 
The notion that foreign nationals frivolously seek review to achieve delay 
oversimplifies the true underlying debate.  The dynamic is an evolving sense of 
immigration sovereignty, with room to consider individual interests, as well as 
the interests of the nation.  The move away from an extreme vision of classical 
immigration law would be upsetting to those who prefer the absolutist view.  As 
Professor Kevin R. Johnson has observed, “One’s views on plenary power 
deeply affect how one views immigration.” 155   The debate is between an 
approach that raises the prominence of concerns about individuals versus an 
approach where the nation has “complete authority to define the rights of 
noncitizens.”156 
During the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s 2013 debate on immigration 
reform (previously mentioned above), Senators Charles Grassley, Richard 
Durbin, and Charles Schumer illustrated competing ideals of judicial review.  
Senator Grassley took a classical view of immigration sovereignty, arguing that 
the nation has the absolute power to draw borderlines, and that the nation owes 
no obligation to foreigners. 157   In response, Senators Durbin and Schumer 
argued that other constitutional considerations have a role in the process, 
including individual rights to access the courts.158  Senator Grassley stated: 
“[T]he bill treats [these legalization] program[s] as a legal right rather than 
 152. Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 39 (1995).  See also Lindsay, supra note 121, at 811 (“Yet even if one 
concedes that the principle of territorial sovereignty implies an authority to govern the right of non-
citizens to enter into and remain within territory, it is unclear why the exercise of such authority 
also requires that immigrants be denied important constitutional rights.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Schuck, Transformation, supra note 9, at 4, 66–67, 76. 
 155. Johnson, Open Borders?, supra note 118, at 212. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Senator Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
Immigration: Hearing on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) 
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (commenting that Senator Grassley’s 
proposal would disrupt the balance of power by limiting judicial review). 
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discretionary benefit just like you have a civil right to come to this country. . . . 
And where is it in the constitution?”159  Senator Durbin countered: 
[T]his amendment by Senator Grassley really gets at a basic element 
in our government that we learned in the first civics class, and that is 
checks and balances so that there is a balance of power in our 
government.  What the senator from Iowa wants to do is to reduce 
judicial review of decisions made by the executive branch of 
government. That’s an extraordinary position to take, particularly for 
the Senator [sic] Judiciary Committee to take. We acknowledge that 
the balance in our government between the three branches is what’s 
kept it democratic and moving in the right direction. . . . What we say 
in this bill is there ought to be somebody reviewing to make sure that 
this decision is consistent with the underlying law.160 
Senator Leahy contributed: “It is amazing in the history that a country [sic] can 
become as powerful, as diverse as [sic] wealthy as United States but [sic] remain 
a democracy. And I think that’s because of our checks and balances.”161  This 
exchange demonstrates the push and pull between conceptions of immigration 
sovereignty.  
Because the delay rationale is consistently raised, no matter how much 
judicial review has already narrowed, the end game for proponents of decreased 
judicial review appears to be preventing court access.  This goal correlates with 
a classical notion of immigration sovereignty, where the power of the nation 
over immigration law is absolute.  Judicial review clearly frustrates this goal. 
Viewed in this context, the debate concerning foreign national access to courts 
in challenging removal decisions shifts from a caricature of a foreign national 
filing a frivolous petition for review motivated solely by delay to a debate over 
the nature of immigration sovereignty in the twenty-first century.162  Peering 
behind the delay rationale reveals this more fundamental debate.  The question 
runs deeper than “delay,” and addresses the balance of power between the 
individual and the nation in immigration law. 
C.  Resolving the Dispute: A Lesson from the United Kingdom 
The battle over immigration sovereignty must be acknowledged to discredit 
the narrative that foreign nationals are doing something unseemly by seeking 
access to judicial review.  In addition to being acknowledged, the battle must 
be resolved for there to be any hope of alleviating the constant push and pull in 
immigration adjudication.  Resolving the tension will require more than formal 
legal adoption of a more modern approach to immigration sovereignty; it will 
 159. Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 160. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin). 
 161. Id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 162. There are undoubtedly other deeper divisions as well, such as a general distaste for the 
courts (a more general separation of powers battle).  See supra Part II.A. 
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require a cultural shift in our understanding of what it means to be a sovereign 
nation in the context of immigration law.  The experience of the U.K. helps to 
explain why more than formal legal recognition is necessary. 
1.  Efforts to Restrict Immigration Judicial Review in the United Kingdom 
In the U.K., there is a similar push and pull in immigration adjudication.163  
There is a push to fulfill democratic principles and obligations to individuals, 
accompanied by efforts to limit court access to foreign nationals. 164   The 
existence of this phenomenon in the U.K. is interesting because the nation has 
integrated a more modern version of sovereignty into its legal principles.165  Yet, 
there is still ambivalence, and even outright resistance, to providing process to 
foreign nationals facing removal. 166   Thus, while a modern conception of 
sovereignty has been integrated formally, the U.K. has yet to fully infiltrate the 
public conception of immigration sovereignty. 
The U.K. has acceded to international agreements that expressly elevate 
concern for individual rights and reject the notion that sovereign will is 
unlimited.  For example, under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), there is an explicit right to family and private life.167  While this right 
is conditional, the ECHR demands that a foreign national’s situation be a 
substantial consideration in an immigration decision. 168   In the context of 
immigration, the ECHR asks if an immigration decision would interfere with an 
individual’s right to family and private life to the extent that the interference is 
 163. As with the United States, immigration issues in the U.K. are complex and influenced by 
various motivations.  Comparisons across the two systems should not be overstated, as U.S. and 
U.K. immigration policy rest on different systems of government and different social and political 
histories.  See supra Part I. 
 164. See, e.g., Alan Travis, Conservatives Promise to Scrap Human Rights Act After Next 
Election, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/30/ 
conservitives-scrap-human-rights-act (noting that British Home Secretary Theresa May indicated 
that avenues of appeal for those facing deportation would be narrowed). 
 165. See infra notes 167–170 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 164. 
 167. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  Per the ECHR, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  Id.  Additionally, the ECHR mandates 
[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of th[at] right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
 168. Huang & Kashmiri v. Sec’y of State, [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C. 167.  See also 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration Tug of 
War Between States and Their Supra-National Associations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 807, 837–38 
(2011). 
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disproportionate to the nation’s legitimate immigration goals.169  This explicit 
acknowledgement of individual interests rejects the classical plenary power 
notion of sovereignty. 
Through the Human Rights Act, the U.K. Parliament made the ECHR 
enforceable in its courts.170  Individuals need not rely solely on European courts 
to adjudicate whether ECHR rights have been violated.  Because the Human 
Rights Act is primary legislation, the full force of parliamentary sovereignty 
shields it.  Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament’s laws 
are not subject to challenge in court; Parliament’s power is plenary. 171   
Therefore, through the Human Rights Act, Parliament expressed an 
unreviewable desire to allow individuals to enforce ECHR rights within the U.K. 
The Human Rights Act creates an interesting dynamic for immigration law in 
the U.K.  Although primary legislation is not subject to court review, courts in 
the U.K. may review the executive’s exercise of power under that legislation, 
including both the formulation of rules under power delegated from Parliament, 
as well as the executive’s application of those rules to an individual.172  The 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet functionally exercise the executive power in the 
U.K.173  Courts in the U.K. can and do review executive action in immigration 
cases, and they may consider whether executive action is in compliance with the 
ECHR. 174   Therefore, even if the executive’s decision on a particular 
immigration application is justified under the U.K.’s immigration rules, a court 
may consider whether the decision otherwise violates ECHR rights.175  Also, the  
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has held that the power to control 
immigration rests on statutory authority, and not on the vestiges of royal 
(Executive) prerogative.176 
While Parliament itself generally wields plenary power, Parliament has 
advanced beyond the U.S. in terms of formal legal recognition of a more modern 
 169. Huang & Kashmiri, [2007] UKHL 11.  Huang & Kashmiri states: 
the ultimate question for the appellate immigration authority is whether the refusal of 
leave to enter or remain, in circumstances where the life of the family cannot reasonably 
be expected to be enjoyed elsewhere, taking full account of all considerations weighing 
in favour of the refusal, prejudices the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently 
serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8. 
Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See John McGarry, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Judges and the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants etc.) Bill, 26 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
 172. Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 543, 550–54 (2013). 
 173. Id. at 550–51. 
 174. Huang & Kashmiri, [2007] UKHL 11. 
 175. See id. 
 176. R. v. Sec’y of State, [2012] UKSC 32. 
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notion of sovereignty, which applies in the context of immigration law. 177  
Through the enforcement of the ECHR, the baseline perspective in immigration 
cases is that the will of the sovereign is not absolute.178 
Despite this formal incorporation of individual rights, the U.K. is experiencing 
similar efforts to narrow court access for foreign nationals.  As in the United 
States, supporters of restricting court access for foreign nationals often cite delay 
as a reason to curtail access.  The existence of this similar phenomenon, despite 
a default position that individual rights matter, suggests that formal legal 
recognition of a more modern view of immigration sovereignty alone will not 
resolve the uncomfortable position of immigration adjudication in the United 
States. 
To better understand the efforts to limit review of immigration removal 
decisions in the U.K., background on the immigration adjudication system itself 
is necessary.179  The system to hear challenges of Home Office (Executive) 
decisions to remove an individual involves both tribunals and courts, and the 
differing roles of tribunals and courts are founded in an approach to court review 
that distinguishes between an appeal and a judicial review.180  In the United 
States, an appeal on the merits and any judicial review for ultra vires activity 
may occur simultaneously as a case works its way from an administrative, or 
executive branch, adjudication into the constitutionally independent Article III 
federal courts.  For example, a federal court of appeals in the United States may 
simultaneously (although subject to scope of review restrictions) review whether 
lower-level agency adjudicators committed errors of fact or law in a particular 
case and determine whether the government acted unlawfully or whether any 
implicated congressional legislation is unconstitutional. 
In contrast, the U.K. distinguishes between an appeal on the merits and a 
judicial review.181  In fact, they are wholly separate procedures.182  During a 
statutory appeal, the reviewing body considers the merits of the case, subject to 
scope of review restrictions, looking for errors of law or fact as applied in the 
particular case.183  Generally, a judicial review is brought in the Administrative 
 177. Even if the effects of the Human Rights Act were not fully anticipated, the formal legal 
conception of sovereignty changed.  See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
 178. Some in the U.K. view this modified notion of sovereignty as an unacceptable 
diminishment of that ideal.  Immigration law is a factor in efforts to disentangle the U.K. from 
European obligations.  See, e.g., Travis, supra note 164 (detailing efforts in the U.K. to curb foreign 
nationals’ court access by “scrap[ping] the Human Rights Act” and to withdraw from the ECHR). 
 179. For a broader comparative discussion of the courts’ role in both U.S. and U.K. 
immigration law, see LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 253–57. 
 180. GINA CLAYTON, TEXTBOOK ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, 254, 271–72 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 4th ed. 2010). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. at 254. 
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Court, a part of the High Court.184  It is not a continuation of an appeal begun in 
an administrative system.185 
During a judicial review, the reviewing court looks to whether the Executive 
has acted unlawfully or whether any implicated Executive rule is unlawful (the 
lawfulness of primary legislation is off limits).186  The focus is not whether a 
decision is wrong on the merits, but rather whether the public body exceeded its 
jurisdiction by acting unlawfully.187 
There are a variety of restrictions on individuals seeking to challenge a 
removal decision through a statutory appeal.188  These restrictions often leave 
seeking a judicial review as the only chance to challenge an immigration 
decision.189  Thus, while judicial review is always important as the mechanism 
to challenge ultra vires activity, it has added significance in immigration cases. 
The number of immigration judicial reviews has led the U.K. government to 
attempt to restrict access to immigration judicial reviews.  According to the 
government, applicants use judicial review as a means of delay to gain more 
time in the U.K.  Three efforts to restrict judicial review of immigration cases in 
the U.K. illustrate the use of the delay rationale: (1) a 2003–2004 effort to 
 184. See LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 113, at 12. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See HARRY WOOLF ET AL., DE SMITH’S JUDICIAL REVIEW 9 (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed. 
2013).  In the U.K., the concept of judicial review is a much newer phenomenon than in the United 
States; U.K. scholars still debate whether that nation’s practice is constitutionally justified.  See id. 
 187. Id. at 200.  The U.K. Supreme Court previously explained: 
[T]he scope of judicial review is an artefact of the common law whose object is to 
maintain the rule of law—that is to ensure that, within the bounds of practical possibility, 
decisions are taken in accordance with the law, and in particular the law which Parliament 
has enacted, and not otherwise. 
R v. Upper Tribunal, [2011] UKSC 28.  The three primary bases for judicial review are procedural 
propriety (were fair procedures used?), rationality (is the decision arbitrary?) and legality (was the 
law applied correctly?).  WOOLF ET AL., supra note 186, at 12.  The distinction between a statutory 
appeal and a judicial review has become blurred as the permitted considerations under judicial 
review have expanded.  Id. at 220.  For example, a court, acting upon an application for judicial 
review, may find that a public body acted unlawfully by applying the wrong legal principles (and 
thus exceeded its jurisdiction).  Id.  But the historical foundation is that a judicial review is not the 
proper forum in which to argue that a public body did everything correctly, but reached the wrong 
conclusion.  Id.  
 188. CLAYTON, supra note 180, at 271; see, e.g., Immigration Act 2014, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/section/15/enacted (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  See 
also Immigration Bill Becomes Law, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
immigration-bill-becomes-law (last updated May 14, 2014) (noting that the bill reduced the number 
of appeal grounds from seventeen to four).  In support of the changes to the appeal system, the 
Immigration Minister said, “The appeals system is like a never-ending game of snakes and ladders, 
with almost 70,000 appeals heard every year.  The winners are foreign criminals and immigration 
lawyers-while the losers are the victims of these crimes and the public.”  Home Office, Immigration 
Bill, Factsheet: Overview of the Bill, GOV.UK 1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249251/Overview_Immigration_Bill_F
actsheet.pdf [hereinafter Home Office, Overview]. 
 189. CLAYTON, supra note 180, at 271. 
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eliminate entirely judicial review in immigration cases; (2) an ongoing effort to 
move immigration judicial review cases from the general courts to the 
immigration tribunals; and (3) a 2012–2013 effort to narrow immigration 
judicial review.  Also, the government has sought to cabin the discretion of 
judges with respect to Article 8 of the ECHR.  These actions further illustrate 
the “anti-access to justice” mood prevalent in the U.K. 
From 2003 to 2004, the U.K. government proposed to entirely oust, or 
eliminate, judicial review in immigration cases.190  Under the proposed ouster 
clause, there would be no judicial review whatsoever.191  The clause specifically 
mentioned abolishing judicial review for lack of jurisdiction, irregularity, error 
of law, and breach of natural justice.192  The proposal caused quite a stir, with 
the controversy spilling out of immigration law circles into broader legal circles 
and the mainstream press.193 
Prominent members of the legal community spoke out against the ouster 
clause.  Lord Woolf, then-Lord Chief Justice (head of the judiciary), warned that 
the ouster clause threatened the rule of law and could lead to calls for a written 
constitution. 194  He said, “I am not over-dramatising [sic] the position if I 
indicate that, if this clause were to become law, it would be so inconsistent with 
the spirit of mutual respect between the different arms of government that it 
could be the catalyst for a campaign for a written constitution.”195  He asked, 
“What areas of government decision-making would be next to be removed from 
the scrutiny of the courts?”196  A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern, said that the Government’s proposal “struck ‘right at the heart of the 
 190. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HOUSE OF LORDS, ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION 
(TREATMENT OF CLAIMANTS, ETC.) BILL: FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2003-04 22–23 (2004). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id.  According to Lord Woolf, the-then Lord Chief Justice, he and other members of 
the judiciary met with the government to discuss an earlier version of the ouster clause.  Lord 
Woolf, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Squire Centenary Lecture: The Rule of Law and a 
Change in the Constitution (Mar. 3, 2004).  The judiciary explained that the clause was in conflict 
with the rule of law, and that it was futile to pursue because there were loopholes in the clause that 
would allow the judiciary to exercise jurisdiction anyway.  Id.  Rather than heeding the judiciary’s 
warnings that the clause violated the rule of law, the government redrafted the clause to try to close 
the loopholes the judiciary identified.  Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Joshua Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is Coming True MPs Have Agreed to 
Abolish the Courts’ Entire Power of Judicial Review Over Decisions to be Taken by a New 
Tribunal, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 4, 2004, at 19 [hereinafter Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is 
Coming True] (“The House of Commons agreed this week to abolish the courts’ entire power of 
judicial review over [immigration] decisions . . . .  There will be no independent judicial oversight 
over decisions to deport immigration applicants and remove asylum-seekers from Britain.”). 
 194. Joshua Rozenberg, Woolf Fury at Asylum Curb on the Courts Blunkett Bill ‘a Threat to 
Rule of Law’, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 4, 2004, at 1. 
 195. Lord Woolf, supra note 192. 
 196. Id. 
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rule of law.’”197  If the clause were adopted, judges threatened to exercise a 
“nuclear option” by refusing to enforce the clause.198  This action would have 
sparked a constitutional crisis, as the judges would be challenging directly the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.199  The Bar Council of England and 
Wales described the ouster clause as “a startling proposition,” and found it 
“incredible that it [was] proposed in the United Kingdom[.]” 200   Professor 
Richard Rawlings described the effort as part of a “‘revenge package’” aimed 
“to pre-empt or drastically reduce a whole activity of formal legal challenge and 
by necessary implication to neuter the judicial role in the constitution.”201 
After the uproar, the government agreed to withdraw the ouster clause, but did 
not abandon its perceived need to restrict immigration judicial review.202  The 
Constitution Secretary at the time of the proposal’s withdrawal said, “I believe 
that we can have the necessary judicial oversight in the system by the higher 
courts and obtain the aims of speed and reduction of abuse.”203 
The Constitution Secretary’s statement reveals that one justification for the 
ouster clause was concern about delay.204  The Home Secretary placed the need 
for the ouster clause at the feet of lawyers, whom he characterized as “dragging 
out cases for months and, in some instances, years.”205  He further described the 
system as “abused.” 206   Rawlings characterized the abuse and delay 
justifications as a “familiar refrain” in British politics.207  Government officials 
described how “people [were] playing the system” and referred to “unnecessary, 
vexatious and useless judicial reviews[.]”208 
While the ouster clause was withdrawn, judicial review has been effectively 
curtailed by Parliament’s creation of the Upper Tribunal, the immigration 
appellate tribunal (part of the Judiciary, but not the High Court), with the power 
 197. Joshua Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn on Asylum Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 16, 2004, at 
2 [hereinafter Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn]. 
 198. Clare Dyer, The Guardian Profile: Lord Woolf, GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, at 13. 
 199. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament has the final word on 
legality.  See McGarry, supra note 171, at 1–2.  The courts exercise judicial review under the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty by reasoning that the courts are carrying out Parliament’s 
intention against ultra vires actions.  Id. at 5–6. 
 200. Andrew Le Sueur, Comment, Three Strikes and It’s Out? The UK Government’s Strategy 
to Oust Judicial Review from Immigration and Asylum Decision-Making, 2004 PUB. L. 225, 233 
(2004). 
 201. Richard Rawlings, Review, Revenge and Retreat, 68 MOD. L. REV. 378, 378 (2005). 
 202. Rozenberg, Labour U-Turn, supra note 197. 
 203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. See id. 
 205. Rozenberg, The ‘Unthinkable’ is Coming True, supra note 193 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 206. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207. Rawlings, supra note 201, at 393. 
 208. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to act as the High Court when exercising judicial review.209  So, even without 
an ouster clause, immigration judicial review is undergoing a transition out of 
the general courts and into the specialized immigration tribunal.  For example, 
many types of judicial reviews are heard in the Upper Tribunal, not in the 
Administrative Court.210  While not an elimination of judicial review per se, the 
change of venue raises questions about whether judicial review will be of the 
same quality in the Upper Tribunal.211  The effort to transfer cases stems from 
the perception that there were too many immigration judicial reviews clogging 
up the Administrative Court.212 
In December 2012, the Ministry of Justice announced its intent to reform 
judicial review generally, including immigration judicial review.213  Among 
other things, the reforms would tighten the availability of judicial review by 
increasing fees.214  While these reforms would affect more than just immigration 
cases, the government mentioned that immigration cases were one of the 
motivations for seeking reform.215  The Minister of Justice’s Consultation Paper 
announcing the proposed reforms acknowledged that the main area of growth in 
applications for judicial review had been immigration and asylum matters, 
comprising seventy-five percent of applications for judicial review.216 
As support for its proposal to limit judicial review, the government not only 
cited the increase in total applications for judicial review across all subject 
matter areas (160 in 1974 and over 11,000 in 2011), but also emphasized the 
“small number of applications per year [that] proceed to a final hearing[.]”217  
The Consultation Paper stated that in 2011, only one in six applications for 
permission to seek judicial review were granted.218  The proposal was based on 
the assumption that because so few applications are granted, the increase in 
numbers of applications must be comprised of “weak or hopeless cases.”219  That 
 209. R v. Upper Tribunal, [2011] UKSC 28. 
 210. See Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Direction Given in Accordance with Part 1 of 
Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and Section 18 of the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY 1 (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Practice+Directions/Tribunals/ 
lcj-direction-jr-iac-21-08-2013.pdf.  See also Constitutional Law Grp., Robert Thomas: 
Immigration Judicial Reviews, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Sept. 12, 2013, 11:40 AM), 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/09/12/robert-thomas-immigration-judicial-reviews/ 
[hereinafter Constitutional Law Grp., Immigration Judicial Reviews]. 
 211. See Constitutional Law Grp., Immigration Judicial Reviews, supra note 210. 
 212. Id. 
 213. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM CP25-2012, at 4, 8–
9 (U.K.) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM]. 
 214. Id. at 25–27. 
 215. Id. at 9–10. 
 216. Id. at 9. 
 217. Id. at 10. 
 218. Id. at 10. 
 219. Id. at 11. 
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assumption influenced the government’s concern “that the Judicial Review 
process may in some cases be subject to abuses, for example, used as a delaying 
tactic, given the significant growth in its use but the small proportion of cases 
that stand any reasonable prospect of success.”220  Again citing the limited 
success rate of cases seeking judicial review, the government stated, “Whilst 
Judicial Review plays a vital role in upholding the rule of law and holding the 
Executive to account, we do not believe it should be allowed to be used as a 
tactical device simply to delay decisions and the consequences flowing from 
them.”221 
In the Impact Assessment accompanying the Consultation Paper, the 
Government commented, “Businesses/individuals may lose out from cases 
being finalised [sic] more quickly if they would benefit indirectly from delays 
in the [judicial review] process.”222  However, the Impact Assessment uncovered 
little data supporting the proposal and revealed that the proposal addressed areas 
where either data was unavailable or that the proposal was based on 
assumptions.223 
Concern about using judicial review as a delay tactic to gain some sort of 
advantage permeates the proposal.224  The U.K. Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association (ILPA) rejected the proposal’s delay justification, explaining other 
forces at work behind increased attempts to access judicial review.225  These 
other forces included attempts to redress poor decision-making by the Home 
Office. 226   Others objected to the delay justification because the proposal 
reached that justification on a “very dubious basis,” emphasizing the major 
limitations of the government’s data. 227  For example, in calculating a low 
success rate for those seeking judicial review, and thus leading the government 
to infer that there were too many meritless claims, one analysis concluded that 
the government excluded cases that dropped out of the system soon after 
 220. Id. at 4. 
 221. Id. at 20. 
 222. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW: ENGAGEMENT EXERCISE 2012, at 3 (U.K.). 
 223. See id. at 1–22. 
 224. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, supra note 213, at 4 (noting 
that “the [g]overnment [was] concerned that the Judicial Review process may in some cases be 
subject to abuses”). 
 225. Immigration Law Practitioners’ Ass’n, ILPA’s Response to the Ministry of Justice 
Consultation: Judicial Review – Proposals for Further Reform, ILPA 1 (2013), 
http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/21180/13.11.01-ILPA-response-to-Ministry-of-Justice-
consultation-Judicial-Review-Proposals-for-Further-Reform.pdf. 
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of-growth-and-abuse/. 
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filing.228  Another study found that “over a third of claims are likely to be settled 
[early on], usually in the claimant’s favour [sic].”229  Without including these 
settlements as “successes,” the government artificially depressed the number of 
cases with a successful outcome.230 
Finally, while not solely targeted at judicial review, a related effort to severely 
restrict the role of judges generally in immigration cases further illustrates the 
anti-process tenor of the discussion surrounding immigration adjudication in the 
U.K.231  As described above, under Article 8 of the ECHR, there is a right to 
respect for private and family life, and this right is enforceable in U.K. courts.232  
This right is qualified, meaning that the government may interfere with the right 
under certain circumstances. 233  A right to private and family life may be 
curtailed if it is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.234 
Therefore, the question of whether Article 8 protections may be curtailed 
becomes one of balancing facts and applying those facts to existing law: a classic 
adjudicatory exercise. 
This Article 8 right implicates immigration cases because, for example, a 
foreign national in deportation proceedings may argue that deportation, and the 
accompanying consequence of separation from family with permission to 
remain in the U.K., would violate the foreign national’s Article 8 rights.235  In 
such a case, the judge deciding whether to order deportation would consider 
whether the government’s desired deportation would unlawfully interfere with 
the foreign national’s Article 8 rights, or whether deportation is justified under 
existing standards.236 
The Home Office has been acting to diminish judges’ roles in balancing 
Article 8 rights.237  Through primary legislation, the Home Office has pushed 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Constitutional Law Grp., Robert Thomas: The New Immigration Rules and the Right to 
Family Life, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 
2012/10/04/robert-thomas-the-new-immigration-rules-and-the-right-to-family-life/ [hereinafter 
Constitutional Law Grp., The New Immigration Rules]. 
 232. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 233. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Constitutional Law Grp., The New Immigration Rules, supra note 231. 
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for changes in the law to dictate how adjudicators determine when there is an 
improper interference with Article 8 rights.238  As one commentator described, 
“The Home Secretary’s view on Article 8, and where the balance lies, will be 
forced on judges.”239  This ongoing controversy raises serious constitutional 
questions about the balance of powers in the U.K., and whether the U.K. is 
complying with its obligations under European law.240 
Similar to events in the United States, court access in immigration cases has 
been a consistent target in the U.K.  Immigration adjudication occupies a similar 
uncomfortable position in the U.K.: it exists, but it is restricted and is the subject 
of efforts to restrict access further.  One major difference is that the U.K. 
Parliament, through primary legislation, has set a default position that individual 
interests are on a more level playing field in immigration law.  Yet, efforts to 
curtail immigrant access to courts continue under the banner of delay. 
2.  A Lesson for the United States 
While the function of and challenges facing immigration adjudication in the 
United States and the U.K. are not identical, they are characterized by a similar 
tension.  Both nations have elaborate systems by which to adjudicate removal 
cases, but those systems are each subject to current restrictions and the near 
constant threat of further restrictions.  In both nations, delay, including blame on 
individual foreign nationals and their attorneys for seeking review, is often 
mentioned as a justification for curtailing access to justice. 
The existence of a similar phenomenon in the U.K. is a discouraging sign; it 
suggests that formally adopting a more modern approach to immigration 
sovereignty is not a guaranteed protection against efforts to narrow court access 
in immigration cases.  It further suggests that underlying conflicts remain, even 
in a nation that has permitted enforcement of the ECHR in its domestic courts. 
What would motivate a government to push its nation to the brink of a 
constitutional crisis, as was accomplished by the proposed ouster clause in the 
U.K.?  Surely not just a concern, based solely on anecdotal evidence, that foreign 
nationals may seek court review to delay action in an immigration case.  There 
are less nuclear options available to screen for frivolous cases, including a study 
to confirm whether there really is a problem at all. There must be something 
more fundamental at stake, and we must peel back the layers to uncover the true 
nature of the argument. 
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Analyzing the underlying issues in the United States reveals a debate about 
immigration sovereignty; conflicting notions of the role of individual rights in 
immigration law are at the core of the debate over the scope of judicial review 
in immigration removal cases.  The U.S. Supreme Court could update its 
explanation of sovereignty in immigration cases.  What are now considered 
exceptions to the plenary power doctrine could become the norm.  The Supreme 
Court could clarify to admirers of the purest form of plenary power that such 
power is not recognized under U.S. law.  Modern notions of sovereignty do not 
require the grant of raw, unrestricted power to the government to do what it likes 
with respect to immigration law.  The Court has already chipped away at the 
plenary power notion of sovereignty through its decisions in cases that scrutinize 
detention practices and that insist on procedural protections during the removal 
hearing process.241  The Court could abandon the plenary power doctrine and 
reframe the legal discourse.  However, the U.K. experience suggests that such a 
formal legal shift is not enough.  Because U.S. immigration law has been steeped 
in classical notions of immigration sovereignty for so long, a cultural shift is also 
required.242 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Immigration adjudication occupies an uncomfortable space in the realm of 
U.S. law.  A system to review a removal decision exists, but it is subject to major 
restrictions and lives under threat of further restrictions.  Since 1961, there have 
been consistent efforts in the United States to restrict judicial review of 
immigration removal decisions.  Proponents frequently justify the need to 
restrict judicial review with the claim that foreign nationals seek access to the 
courts as a means to delay removal.  This narrative implies that foreign nationals 
engage in questionable behavior when seeking review of a decision to remove 
the individual from the United States. 
This Article finds the claims about delay to disguise a fundamental 
disagreement about immigration sovereignty.  The delay rationale lacks depth 
and support.  Instead, arguments to limit judicial review coincide with support 
for a nineteenth century, pure plenary power notion of immigration sovereignty 
that prescribes elevating the will of the nation above all else.  A disagreement 
about the proper meaning of immigration sovereignty is at the root of the 
uncomfortable position of immigration adjudication in the United States.  The 
debate is about the place of individual rights in immigration law, and the debate 
should proceed on those terms. 
It would be a significant advancement if the U.S. Supreme Court were to 
abandon completely the plenary power notion of sovereignty in immigration 
 241. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & 
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law.  But it is doubtful that such a decision would move immigration 
adjudication from its uncomfortable tension.  While the U.K. has formally 
integrated a more modern notion of sovereignty into its domestic law, efforts to 
restrict review of removal decisions continue.  This experience suggests that a 
more fundamental cultural shift is needed.  Formal legal change is an important 
step, but on its own, it is not a guarantee that immigration adjudication will find 
peace. 
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